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Tax Unrest Among Market Traders – the Local Side of ActionAid´s 
International Tax Justice Campaign in Nigeria 
 
Kas Sempere 
 
 
Summary 
 
Tax justice has become a popular concept, and a number of international tax justice 
campaigns have exposed aspects such as the unfairness of tax havens and harmful tax 
breaks. Yet, the idea of tax justice at the local level is less well-known. The impact of 
campaigns to end tax havens and harmful tax competition may seem far from the lives and 
day-to-day tax struggles of many people living in poverty, including market traders in the 
informal sector. ActionAid, an international non-governmental organisation (NGO), managed, 
not without challenges, to integrate tax claims of market traders – such as multiple taxation – 
into its international tax justice campaign in Nigeria. Possibly more could have been done to 
include additional complaints from traders, such as those facing sudden and steep tax 
increases and tax harassment, and to support their actions – their visits and letters to the 
government, in addition to their tax strikes. Overall, however, ActionAid succeeded in linking 
their campaign at the local, national and international levels, retaining relevance at each of 
these levels by identifying different targets that could be influenced. ActionAid’s work is a 
positive example for other tax justice campaigns willing to give a stronger voice to market 
traders. Borrowing some concepts from social movement theory, this paper narrates the 
campaign’s journey, with a focus on how the market traders’ own tax challenges were 
integrated. 
 
Keywords: tax activism; tax justice; campaigning; market traders; local marketplace; multiple 
taxation; social movement theory; Nigeria; ActionAid; international non-governmental 
organisations. 
 
Kas Sempere is a sociologist with fifteen years of experience in universities and NGOs. Kas 
undertook her PhD on tax justice campaigning in Nigeria and the UK at IDS, UK (2012-
2016). She currently works as a research advisor for Christian Aid in London, and is 
collaborating in an ICTD study on the gendered dimensions of taxes and other payments in 
local markets in Nigeria (forthcoming). 
  
 
 
4
Contents 
 
 Summary            3 
 Acknowledgements           5 
 Acronyms            5 
 Introduction            6 
 
1  Literature review           8 
1.1  The history of tax activism          8 
1.2 The history of tax justice          8 
1.3  Towards local tax justice          9 
1.4  Local tax justice through ‘corporate-tax-for-public-services’     9 
1.5  Local tax justice through market taxation struggles in Nigeria   10 
 
2  Concepts and methodology       11 
2.1 Why social movement theory       11 
2.2 Why Action Aid, JDPC-Ondo and Nigeria      11 
2.3 Why market traders         13 
2.4 The research process        13 
 
3 Findings          14 
3.1  From aid to tax claims – thinking of a Tax Justice Campaign in  
ActionAid (2005-2007)        14 
3.2  Tax corporate claims – the first steps of the Tax Justice Campaign (2008-11) 18 
3.3  Towards local claims – involving other ActionAid member countries in the  
Tax Justice Campaign (2012-2014)       21 
3.4  Campaign actions and their relation to market traders (2008-2014)  24 
3.5  Market trader actions and their relation to the campaign (2008-2014)  25 
 
4 Discussion          28 
 
5 Conclusion          31 
 
 References          33 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1 Location of Abuja and Akure (Ondo)      12 
Figure 2 Interviews in the markets, Akure, Ondo State    14 
Figure 3 Competing narratives on tax justice in ActionAid, 2008-2014  20 
Figure 4 Example of local-to-international frame     20 
Figure 5 Comparative list of claims made by traders and claims made in the  
campaign         23 
Figure 6 Examples of AAN and JDPC repertoires of action    25 
Figure 7 Ways of relating to the tax authorities in Akure    25 
Figure 8 Diversity of tax claims in an Akure rally     28 
  
 
 
5
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank Mick Moore for encouraging me to write this paper, and Akinola 
Adekunle at Adekunle Ajasin University and other anonymous reviewers for their revisions. 
Thanks to Bridget Burrows (ActionAid), Soren Ambrose (ActionAid) and Tunde Aremu 
(ActionAid Nigeria) for feedback of previous drafts. For PhD fieldwork in Nigeria upon which 
this article is based, I thank Emma Pearce (ActionAid), Kate Carroll (ActionAid), Kate 
Newman (Christian Aid), Onyinyechi Okechukwu (ActionAid Nigeria), Ruth Kelly (ActionAid 
UK) and Tasha Adams (ActionAid UK). I also wish to thank Akinrimisi John, Bisodun 
Omolola, ‘Lovette’ and Oluwadare Wasiu as research assistants and English-Yoruba 
translators, Anthony Etim for sharing his market stories, and Akinola Adekunle and 
Olubukola Ayeni for the photos and assistance in the Ondo visits. Thanks to all the 
respondents, especially market traders, for their time. I acknowledge the Mutua Madrileña 
Foundation and Sussex University for granting me two allowances that allowed me to travel 
to Nigeria in 2013 and 2014. As always, thanks to Mike Aiken for the excellent proofreading. 
 
 
Acronyms 
 
ActionAid  ActionAid International Federation 
AAN   ActionAid Nigeria  
AAUK   ActionAid UK  
BIR-Ondo  Ondo State Board of Internal Revenue 
FIRS   Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service 
IDS   Institute of Development Studies 
JDPC   Justice Development and Peace Centre 
NGO   Non-governmental organisation 
TJC   Tax Justice Campaign (also known as Tax Power Campaign)1 
UN   United Nations 
 
 
  
                                                            
1  ActionAid renamed the campaign as ‘Tax Power’ later on. At the time of fieldwork, AAN and AAUK were using TJC. To 
simplify, I use TJC for all the actors. See <www.actionaid.org/tax-power>. 
 
 
6
Introduction  
 
I would note the usual things when I visited a local market in Nigeria to buy my daily goods: 
the strong smells as I walked past the stalls; the arrangement of tomatoes, yam, cloths and 
buckets piled up in pyramidal shapes; the battle of vendors' voices trying to scream loudest 
for their product; and the cleanliness of the place – or lack of it. As I started to visit markets to 
interview traders, I discovered structures that were more invisible to the visitor – the variety 
of plantain, gari, butcher and plastic product associations; the unspoken hierarchy of union 
leaders; the detailed and complex setting of prices, taxes and fees; the products that traders 
would be allowed to sell and the market spaces where they would be allowed to set up stall – 
with space stipulated to the centimetre.  
 
As I gradually got familiar with this delicate order of the marketplace, I wondered how on 
earth my NGO campaign colleagues would integrate the tax struggles of market traders into 
an international campaign targeting tax havens and corporate tax advantages. Consider the 
next three vignettes as if you were the campaign manager in charge of putting this all 
together in a single, multi-country tax justice campaign for a large international NGO: 
  
1. ActionAid UK offices in Farringdon, London. Staff at the NGO publish a report about tax 
havens – providing evidence of how Barclays Bank promotes their existence (ActionAid 
UK 2013).2 The OECD estimates that low-income countries lose more funds to tax 
havens than the amount they receive in aid each year (OECD in ActionAid 2015), while 
ActionAid notes that almost half of all investment into these countries arrives through tax 
havens (ActionAid 2015). It is no surprise then that tax havens constitute a key activist 
demand for low-income countries – not only to expose the annual multi-million dollar 
financial resources lost by these countries, but also to show how this offshore system 
has long existed as the conventional way for businesses to operate (Palan 2009).  
2. ActionAid Nigeria office in Gwarinpa, Abuja. A new research report states that Nigeria 
lost out on USD3.3 billion due to a ten-year tax break granted by the Nigerian 
government to three of the world’s largest oil and gas companies – Shell, Total and ENI 
(ActionAid UK 2016).3 ActionAid Nigeria's campaign manager further complained that: ‘to 
track what corporate bodies are doing, the first thing is to look at the annual report, how 
much profits they made and tax they paid. But [when] you get to the Corporate Affairs 
Commission in the registers of the companies in Nigeria supposed to have those 
documents... there is nothing. Either the files are missing or the documents are not 
there. Sometimes they have never been filed. Sometimes someone has removed them’. 
It is no surprise that the Nigerian NGO takes up tax breaks as another key campaign 
claim. 
3. In Akure, the capital of Ondo State in South-West Nigeria, market trader Amaka does 
not hear about the headline news published in the UK and Nigerian capitals.4 Reports 
about Barclays or tax breaks do not mean much to her. She does not have a bank 
account and rarely enjoys the good fortune afforded by the custom of saving. In the local 
market where Amaka sells, the traders interviewed noted the various challenges to 
which they were subjected. These included: multiple taxation,5 sudden and steep 
increases in tax, flat tax rates irrespective of what is earned, tax harassment and 
                                                            
2  Tax havens are jurisdictions with low or no taxation, often used by multinationals to reduce the tax paid in the countries 
where they work. 
3  Tax breaks are a type of tax incentive by which companies do not pay tax for a period. 
4  All names representing interviewees are fictitious. 
5           Multiple taxation refers to a situation in which a taxpayer is taxed more than once for the same activity or item due to a    
lack of tax collection harmonisation between national, state and local administrative tiers. See Section 3.3. 
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deficient public services. In response, ActionAid’s partner association JDPC-Ondo 
published a video (2013) showing Akure’s unequal market tax system.6 
 
These vignettes in London, Abuja and Akure represent three ways of bringing to light the 
idea of tax justice, broadly understood as work concerned with pro-poor and redistributive tax 
systems. Today, tax justice has become a popular concept at international and national 
levels, and reports and campaigns have exposed the unfairness of tax havens and harmful 
tax breaks. Yet, the idea of tax justice at the local level is less well-known. For many people 
living in poverty around the world, including market traders in the informal sector,7 the impact 
of any campaigning about tax havens or harmful tax competition seems far from their daily 
lives and tax struggles.  
 
Some international NGOs have integrated the local level into their international tax 
campaigns by noting the benefits that tax collected from multinational corporations can have 
in financing public services. Yet, linkages between collecting tax and allocating it for public 
services are not straightforward, and there may be further challenges in relation to 
distribution, such as the politics of setting budgets, corruption and inefficiency. It still remains 
hard for people such as traders to see any relatively quick improvement in their lives. 
 
While work on tax-for-public-services is an important step for integrating the local level into 
international tax justice campaigns, this paper presents another option – that of including the 
tax challenges that people in poverty are familiar with. In the case of market traders in 
Nigeria, these include – amongst others – multiple taxation, presumptive taxation challenges 
and tax harassment in the marketplace. Integrating the tax challenges raised by those most 
affected by poverty is key to mobilising them, while avoiding speaking on their behalf. 
 
ActionAid, not without challenges, managed to integrate local trader struggles into its 
international tax justice campaign in Nigeria. This paper narrates this journey. While more 
could have possibly been done to position market traders at the centre of the campaign, 
ActionAid set a positive example for other tax justice campaigns by aiming to achieve more 
direct involvement from market traders and other large deprived groups, such as smallholder 
farmers. 
 
This paper is divided into five sections. The literature review (Section 1) looks back at the 
history of tax activism and tax justice as a concept, and reviews initiatives involving local tax 
justice – including narratives on tax-for-public-services and market tax activism in Nigeria. 
Section 2 presents three social movement theory concepts – frames, repertoires and 
resonance – and uses these to explore the question ‘how has ActionAid channelled tax 
unrest among market traders in its international tax justice campaign in Nigeria?’ This section 
closes with a justification of the case study selected – ActionAid, JDPC-Ondo, Nigeria and 
market traders – and provides notes on the research process. Section 3 sets out the findings, 
and describes the tax claims and actions both in the campaign and amongst the traders 
outside it. Section 4 discusses how ActionAid managed to both integrate local market traders' 
demands and link them to other campaign levels. This is followed by the conclusions in 
Section 5.  
 
 
  
                                                            
6  Video (Ondo 2013): <https://youtu.be/5GHgiJ2osTE>. 
7  Market traders are those whose activity is inscribed in a market place, as compared to those selling in open-air locations 
such as sidewalks, parks, alleyways, and transport junctions and hubs (Vanek et al. 2012). 
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1  Literature review 
 
Taxation has gained increasing importance within development studies, policy and praxis as 
a key area to strengthen development and governance. Comparatively, tax activism and tax 
justice are relatively unexplored areas of study. In particular, the area of local tax justice in 
relation to market traders and market taxation has been little studied. This review looks at 
these themes globally and in Nigeria.  
 
1.1 The history of tax activism 
 
Taxation and activism have long co-existed (Burg 2004). Taxes have created both 
supporters and resisters, in that as long as taxes have existed, people have protested either 
to keep them, change them or avoid them. Taxation has been present worldwide for at least 
2500 years. Tax revolts are similarly enduring and widespread. David Burg dates evidence of 
tax protests back to the later Han dynasty (AD 25-AD 220) in Asia, the era of Hammurabi 
(1792-1750 BC) in Babylon [Iraq], and the Roman Empire (27 BC-AD 337) in Europe. Many 
major historic events, such as the Magna Carta and the American and French Revolutions, 
originated largely, Burg (2004) argues, from tax revolts.  
 
Tax activism has included overt revolts and orderly civil disobedience, spanning different 
moments in the process of tax collection and distribution, and have been concerned with who 
gets taxed and who enjoys tax dividends (Esposito in Anderson and Herr 2007). Reasons for 
tax activism are varied, and include: a refusal to assign legitimacy for governments to tax 
citizens (Martin 2013); tax pacifism or a rejection of contributions to either military budgets 
and operations; wars conducted through taxation; and struggles against unequal distribution 
of wealth and attention to those groups insufficiently targeted by tax systems. This review 
focuses on the latter – inequality as a reason for tax activism. 
 
1.2 The history of tax justice 
 
Tax justice has become a popular subject in recent times8 fed by events such as financial 
crises and tax haven scandals. For as long as tax structures have existed, people have 
fought for these to be responsive to the poorest in each town and country. More 
contemporary than taxation by nation states is the idea of international taxation and 
international tax activism, which includes action aimed at taxing global transactions and 
ending tax havens.  
 
After the Bretton Woods system of monetary management ended in 1971, economist James 
Tobin suggested a currency transaction tax to slow down foreign exchange traffic. More than 
twenty-five years later, following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the idea was revived when 
Ignacio Ramonet, the editor of Le Monde Diplomatique, created the Association for the 
Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC) to promote the 
introduction of this tax. The tax rapidly became an issue supported by the global justice 
movement, and emerged as a discussion theme – not only in academic circles, but also on 
the streets and in parliaments. The initiative was revitalised in the UK by Oxfam and War on 
Want amongst others after the 2008 global financial crisis under the name of the ‘Robin 
Hood Tax’ campaign.9  
 
Besides actions to tax global financial transactions, activists have also exposed more 
systemic issues about secrecy jurisdictions and illicit financial flows. Tax havens started in 
                                                            
8  See e.g. TJN (undated); Thorndike and Ventry (2002); Dodge (2004); Kohonen et al. (2011); Leaman (2013); Parsons 
(2011). 
9  <https://waronwant.org/sites/default/files/robin_hood_tax_0.pdf; http://robinhoodtax.org.uk/bringrobinhome>.  
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the nineteenth century (Hodges 2013; Palan 2009), yet the first scandals about them did not 
break until the 1970s after pioneering investigations (TJN undated). Set up in 1979, US 
Citizens for Tax Justice published its first report on financial statements of large corporations 
in 1984 (Pugh 2011). Launched in 2003, the Tax Justice Network (now Global Alliance for 
Tax Justice) received support from Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General at the time, for its first 
major newspaper headlines on tax havens and world poverty (Campbell 2004). Other 
initiatives included the Financial Transparency Coalition and the Tax Haven Secrecy 
campaign.10 Since 1997, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists has 
released confidential data, such as the Panama and Paradise papers in 2016-17, which has 
kept tax havens in the headlines. 
 
1.3 Towards local tax justice 
 
In the broad sense, tax justice explores pro-poor and redistributive tax systems able to 
reduce income and social inequality. It involves a transparent process of pro-poor collection 
(those who have less, pay less) and pro-poor expenditure (those who have less, receive 
more), for instance, through public services (e.g. TJN 2012; War on Want and PCS 2013).  
 
The international tax justice initiatives cited above often include a perspective on low-income 
countries. For instance, they suggest the use of international tax collection to finance 
development initiatives in low-income countries; expose the negative effects that tax havens 
have on the poorest; and value the role of low-income countries in global wealth-creation 
through corporate economic activity in their territories (e.g. Oxfam 2000).  
 
However, notions of tax justice that listen to and mobilise those most affected by poverty are 
less common. How do the poorest define tax justice, and what struggles do they include 
under this banner? Studying how tax justice unfolds locally is important – both ethically, to 
avoid speaking about the poorest without involving them in tax campaigns, and operationally, 
since the lack of campaign relevance for traders and other key groups such as smallholder 
farmers misses an opportunity for mobilisation (see Section 2.3 for a justification of traders 
as a target group).  
 
1.4 Local tax justice through ‘corporate-tax-for-public-services’ 
 
One way in which international NGOs such as ActionAid and Oxfam (Seery 2014) have 
integrated the local level into international campaigns is by exposing the narrative of 
corporate-tax-for-public-services. This refers to the potential benefits that tax collected from 
multinational corporations – as a result of ending tax avoidance11 and tax breaks12 – could 
have on financing local public services.  
 
For instance, ActionAid reported that USD138 billion per annum is lost by poor countries due 
to corporate income tax breaks given to multinationals (ActionAid 2013). ActionAid suggests 
that this amount would be enough to send to primary school the 57 million children who 
currently do not go; provide the agricultural investment needed – USD42.7 billion – to 
achieve a world free from hunger; and meet international goals to reduce ill health more than 
twice over – USD58.9 billion (Burrows 2015; see Adams 2016 for a similar reasoning). 
Burrows (2015) adds to this example other calculations on tax-for-education globally and tax-
for-public-services in Uganda. 
 
                                                            
10  <https://financialtransparency.org/end-tax-haven-secrecy/>.   
11  Tax avoidance refers to legal arrangements around and within companies in a multinational group purposefully created 
to reduce their tax payments (TJN-Africa and ActionAid 2012). 
12  Tax breaks refer to the tax relief granted to companies by national governments. This is often related to tax competition, 
the rivalry created amongst neighbouring countries to attract companies (TJN-Africa and ActionAid 2012).  
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Beyond these hypothetical calculations, little evidence exists to demonstrate how increases 
in tax may result in improved local public services. One study found that the more tax 
collected by African countries in relation to their GDP, the greater was their realisation of 
Millennium Development Goals in almost all cases (Waris and Kohonen 2011). However, this 
could be a correlation rather than a causation, as governments that organise better to collect 
tax may also organise better to achieve other goals (Burrows 2015). Moreover, the 
realisation of the Millennium Development Goals may not necessarily happen through the 
funding and improvement of public services.  
 
All in all, linking tax collection and public service allocation as a campaign claim is a step 
forward towards naming the potential direct benefits for people living in poverty. However, 
while affordable public services are critical to the wellbeing and fulfilment of the rights of the 
poor, these tax-for-public-services links are far from straightforward – the eventual ripple 
effects arising from these collections and allocations may still encounter, further downstream, 
distributive challenges such as corruption and inefficiency.  
 
1.5 Local tax justice through market taxation struggles in Nigeria 
 
Besides work on tax-for-public-services, international NGOs such as Christian Aid (Carroll 
2011) and Oxfam Novib (2016) have developed projects and research related to markets, the 
informal sector and tax collection challenges. For instance, Civil Society Legislative 
Advocacy Centre, Oxfam’s partner, organised meetings with informal sector workers. 
However, there is insufficient information to know whether and how these were integrated 
into international tax justice campaigns. 
 
Beyond work developed by international NGOs, market activism on taxes has a long history 
in Nigeria. Women’s leadership in particular is well documented. In 1929, thousands of 
eastern Nigeria women protested against female direct taxation as part of colonial indirect 
rule. Market squares became the women’s meeting – and self-funding – places for what is 
known as the Igbo Women´s War or Aba Women´s Riots (Van Allen 1975; Andrade 2002; 
Byfield 2003). The protests lasted almost three months and occurred in several provinces, 
most intensely along important market routes dominated by itinerant women traders (Byfield 
2003). Revolts eventually forced a change in the system of indirect rule of the eastern region, 
but during this fifty-five women lost their lives (UNESCO 2015).  
 
Protests against market taxes continued from the 1920s to the 1950s. Colonial policies in the 
1920s, such as external price controls and direct taxation, triggered the creation of the Lagos 
Market Women’s Association, led by Madam Alimotu Pelewura. The Association sought an 
end to female taxation, the right to vote and keep their traditional role in deciding market 
locations, commodity pricing, and control of fees charged for market maintenance (Smith 
2005). In the 1930s and 1940s, associated women had some success in overturning colonial 
laws, such as the separate income tax on Lagosian women (UNESCO 2015).  
 
In 1941-47, Egba women staged several acts of civil disobedience and demonstrations 
against colonial authorities, taxation, market closures and commodity delays (Byfield 2003). 
Gender-differentiated tax laws were introduced in Abeokuta in 1918. If women failed or 
refused to pay tax, they were often harassed, arrested or even stripped, and their houses 
examined (UNESCO 2015). With an estimate of 20,000 members, the Abeokuta Union (later 
renamed Nigerian Women´s Union) asked to end any taxation without democratic 
representation (UNESCO 2015). Under the leadership of Madam Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, 
a succession of marches against the authorities led to the suspension of female direct 
taxation in 1948 (Smith 2005; UNESCO 2015). 
 
Market traders’ unrest and protests to tax authorities continue in Nigeria today – a topic we 
return to in Sections 3.3 and 3.5. 
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2  Concepts and methodology 
 
This section explains the choice of social movement theory to understand unrest and 
activism, and of ActionAid, Nigeria and JDPC-Ondo as case study sites. It then justifies why 
market traders were studied as a key population for tax issues, and concludes with notes on 
the research process – including research limitations, timeframe, sampling, data collection 
and analysis, and ethics. 
  
2.1 Why social movement theory  
 
Why are social movement concepts useful for studying a tax justice campaign? Social 
movement theory is one of the oldest and most exhaustive bodies of theory to study protest 
(della Porta and Diani 2006). While originally designed to study social movements, social 
movement theory can be used as a general theory of collective action and thus extrapolated 
to study other actors that campaign, such as political parties, interest groups and voluntary 
organisations (della Porta and Diani 2006; Tarrow 2011).  
 
One way in which social movement scholars have studied activism is through frame and 
repertoire theory, which looks at the claims and actions used in political activity. ‘Frames’ are 
the set of beliefs and meanings that inspire action (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 
1986; Snow 2013). ‘Repertoires’ are the set of protest actions that a group can use to make 
claims, such as a march or a strike (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 2006). Frames and repertoires gain 
strength when they succeed in appealing to activists, public supporters and opponents. For 
instance, opponents may respond with their own counter-frames and counter-repertoires.  
 
The idea of ‘resonance’, or the possibility that frames will catch on, can help explore which 
claims succeeded as part of ActionAid’s campaign (Benford and Snow 2000; Noakes and 
Johnston 2005; della Porta and Diani 2006). Resonance is key for activist effectiveness 
(Benford and Snow 2000). To be resonant, a frame has to be credible, culturally appropriate, 
and relevant, or able to read the audience's priorities. While cultural appropriateness focuses 
on the broader cultural context, relevance relates to the daily experiences and needs of an 
audience (Noakes and Johnston 2005).  
 
Overall, these concepts should help us respond to the question: how has ActionAid 
channelled tax unrest among market traders in its international tax justice campaign in 
Nigeria? More concretely: how were tax claims from traders integrated into the campaign?; 
how were tax actions from traders integrated into the campaign?; and how were local 
demands linked to national and international campaign issues? The first two questions are 
explored in Section 3, and the last question is addressed in Section 4.  
  
2.2 Why ActionAid, JDPC-Ondo and Nigeria 
 
An ‘extreme’ case study reveals: ‘information on unusual cases, which can be especially 
problematic or especially good ... to understand the limits of existing theories and to develop 
new concepts’ (Flyvbjerg 2011). I selected ActionAid, ActionAid Nigeria, JDPC-Ondo and 
Nigeria as I felt that they represented an especially good case study. ActionAid was 
important for its strong activist and decentralised reputation; ActionAid Nigeria and JDPC-
Ondo presented solid tax work; and Nigeria presented a case of a highly unequal country.  
 
 
12
ActionAid, an international NGO working on poverty and injustice in forty-five countries,13 has 
gained a reputation among peer organisations and academia14 for its activist identity15 and 
decentralised decision-making structures. Founded in 1972 to undertake child sponsorship 
and provision of services, the NGO transitioned into a more political organisation, setting an 
explicit global strategy to become a campaigning organisation in the 2010s. ActionAid 
followed NGO trends towards decentralisation at the time. Yet, what distinguished the NGO 
was the radical way in which this was applied (Newman 2011). For instance, the 
headquarters were split from ActionAid’s country founder, ActionAid UK (AAUK), and moved 
to South Africa in 2003. AAUK then became one more voting country member 
(Jayawickrama and Ebrahim 2013). 
  
These factors gave ActionAid the conditions to create bold, dispersed global campaigns with 
a strong local mobilisation component compared to other NGOs. While Christian Aid and 
Oxfam were also campaigning on tax justice in Nigeria at the time of the research, they had 
not placed campaigning in as central a role in their global strategies as ActionAid, nor 
detailed its (local) operative components.16 Thus, ActionAid can be taken as an extreme case 
to explore the full potential role of the local level in an international campaign.  
 
 
Within the Federation, ActionAid Nigeria (hereafter AAN) was 
one of the strongest country members in tax work. For similar 
reasons AAN staff and I then chose Justice Development and 
Peace Centre in Ondo state (JDPC-Ondo; see Figure 1), as it 
was the most advanced AAN partner in tax work at the time. 
The security and logistical conditions were also the best due 
to the fact that I had the chance to stay in a safe and 
economical Catholic nuns’ hostel in Ondo’s capital Akure. A 
strong network of youth campaigners existed that I could work 
with as research assistants. JDPC-Ondo was chosen after 
visiting AAN partners in four states (FCT, Kaduna, Kogi and 
Ondo), and interviewing partner staff from two other states (Benue and Delta).  
 
Tax justice in Nigeria is especially relevant, since inequality in the country is high and 
increasing. This is despite an abundance of natural resources and rapid growth, which has 
averaged around 7 per cent per year since 2000 (The Economist 2014). The middle (median) 
earner receives USD1.80 a day, which is below the international poverty line of USD1.90 a 
day (Murray 2016). In countries with a similar GDP per capita, the middle earner gets more 
per day, for example, around USD7 in Tonga and USD9 in Bolivia (Murray 2016). Oxfam and 
Development Finance International consider Nigeria as the country that commits least to 
reducing inequality (Lawson and Martin 2017; McIntyre 2017; Oxfam 2017). Their global 
index puts Nigeria last in a list of 152 countries as measured by the dimensions of tax, 
spending and labour.17 According to the World Bank, Nigeria’s tax/GDP ratio is one of the 
lowest in the world – 1.48 per cent in 2013.18 
 
  
                                                            
13  <www.actionaid.org/who-we-are>; a full historical account can be found in Newman (2011: ch.4) 
14  This was mostly by Harvard and IDS-Sussex universities (Sempere 2016). 
15  Universities such as Harvard and IDS-Sussex have studied ActionAid´s radical and innovative nature in a number of 
publications (Sempere 2016). Some consider ActionAid ‘arguably the most radical large INGO’ (Newman 2011: 102).    
16  <www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/about-us/partnership-change and http://oxf.am/ZPbh>. 
17  <www.inequalityindex.com/>.  
18  <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=NG&view=chart>; also see 
<www.wider.unu.edu/project/government-revenue-dataset>.  
Figure 1 Location of 
Abuja and Akure (Ondo) 
Source: United Nations. 
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2.3 Why market traders 
 
Market traders and market taxation is central to tax justice for at least two reasons – because 
of traders’ weight in the economy, and because of the relevance that tax has for their 
livelihoods.  
 
The informal sector is paramount for most countries, including advanced economies (IMF 
2017). The informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa is the second largest in the world, 
accounting for 38 per cent of GDP in the region from 2010 to 2014. The Nigerian informal 
sector stands out as one of the largest – at 50 to 65 per cent of GDP (IMF 2017). The 
Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (2010) counted 54.6 million informal sector workers in 
2009. Moreover, the wholesale and retail trade sector – which includes market traders – is 
the second largest sector (with 24.9 per cent of all workers), only exceeded in scale by the 
agriculture, forestry and farming sector.  
 
Market taxes and payments are equally relevant. They are constantly present in traders’ daily 
lives. For a trader, a rise in market taxes can mean the difference between self-sufficiency 
and dependence, between food and hunger. The market tax protests in Nigeria’s history, as 
described above, are testimony to this.  
 
While the focus on market traders is important, they only represent one type of local tax 
activism. For example, smallholder farmers are another large and economically relevant 
group whose tax demands and activism do not seem to have been much studied. An AAN 
campaign manager noted in his feedback (2016) that multiple taxation work from AAN has 
gradually included farmers besides traders, with smallholder farmer women having become 
stronger as part of Nigeria’s Tax Justice and Governance Platform.  
 
2.4 The research process 
 
The PhD fieldwork took place in Abuja, Akure and London between January 2013 and 
December 2014. Data was collected through qualitative methods and included participant 
observation in campaign activities, a review of archives and old internal reports, key 
informant interviews (lasting at least an hour), group discussions, and shorter semi-
structured interviews with traders (lasting at least fifteen to twenty minutes). Forty-seven key 
informants were interviewed from organisations involved in the campaign. This included 
seven with ActionAid International Secretariat,19 nine with AAN, four with AAUK, three with 
JDPC-Ondo, five with other TJN-Nigeria partners, three with international partners, four with 
Nigerian campaigners and seven with UK campaigners. Four group discussions were held 
with Activistas,20 and two with AAN and JDPC staff. Data from actors external to the 
campaign was obtained through documentation, participation in workshops with national tax 
and investment authorities and donors, as well as a few key informant interviews (two from 
state tax authorities and three from academia).  
  
Data relating to market traders included a review of work by AAN and JDPC-Ondo and 
primary data collection in the states of FCT, Kaduna and Ondo. This comprised semi-
structured interviews with traders in the markets and during workshops. The traders present 
in workshops related to AAN and partners, while those visited in markets did not. Informal 
chats were also held with traders during several visits organised for women’s rights activities 
in Gobue and Kuje (FCT). At least fifty traders were interviewed by myself and research 
colleagues (see Figure 2), and five visits were made to markets – Akure’s Isikan main market 
                                                            
19  TJC-related international secretariat teams include the tax power campaign team, the advocacy team and the 
mobilisation team on digital campaigning.  
20         Activistas are youth campaigners supporting ActionAid. 
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(visited twice), an open-air market in the outskirts of Akure, Kaduna’s main market, and 
Gwagwalada market in FCT (which was undertaken by youth campaigners only).21 
 
Figure 2 Interviews in the markets, Akure, Ondo State 
 Source: Kas Sempere 
 
Data for this paper was collected as part of my PhD fieldwork about political action in 
ActionAid´s Tax Justice Campaign in Nigeria and the UK (Sempere 2016). Therefore, the 
emphasis was on campaigning, while tax justice just happened to be ActionAid’s most 
advanced global campaign at the time. I, however, collected sufficient data on tax, and 
thought that activist theory could offer an interesting perspective to explore this material. A 
specific study on gender, taxation and market traders in Nigeria is forthcoming in the ICTD 
series (Akpan and Sempere forthcoming).  
 
I used the open-access software programme Sonal for coding and analysis. Sonal facilitated 
the organisation of data by audio themes and by full transcription. I used the faster audio 
option to arrange all interviews by themes and the slower transcription option for quotable 
interviews. I/we asked for consent to collect, record and use data and ensured the 
confidentiality of all traders. Some key informants were happy to be named. I shared results 
with ActionAid and partners, and integrated their feedback into the final findings – see 
methodology in Sempere (2016) for more details. 
 
 
3  Findings 
 
Consideration of the issue of tax began in ActionAid around 2005. Three years later, the Tax 
Justice Campaign (TJC) saw an opportunity to expand internationally and in Nigeria. This 
section looks at the claims and actions that took place during the campaign, as well as the 
claims and actions of market traders inside and outside it. 
 
3.1 From aid to tax claims – thinking of a Tax Justice Campaign in ActionAid 
(2005-2007) 
 
Tax justice became a campaign theme in ActionAid as a result of initial pushes and support 
from some African and Asian ActionAid members and ActionAid UK. These tax advocates 
navigated through times of internal division and resistance in the NGO, before entering a 
period in which a new context eventually facilitated the campaign launch.  
 
The first internal discussions about tax among ActionAid member organisations started in 
2005. An AAUK ex-staff member, involved in the process at the time, pointed to internal 
reasons as the main push to take up tax issues: ‘the idea to go with tax was one that really 
came from the South [sic] to a certain extent and then it was really taken forward by the 
North [sic] … there were some very progressive voices in the organisation from Africa and 
Asia saying ... we don’t want to be working on aid any more ... on making aid more effective, 
more honest’ (interview, 2013).  
 
                                                            
21  Video (Abuja 2013): <www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZkyAivUPxI>.  
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One reason for discontent was the limited advocacy capacity of the aid narrative. An AAUK 
ex-staff member reflected: ‘at times you were wondering ... why aren't countries in the South 
picking it [aid] up ... the reason is that they wanted to hold their countries accountable, not 
the UK government accountable. That was AAUK’s job, not their job’ (interview, 2013). 
Contrarily, tax justice was seen as a better way for African and Asian staff to be able to hold 
their governments to account: ‘there is a lot of [political] support for this tax campaign in a 
way that there wasn't for aid or for debt ... from Country Directors in the South because they 
really see this as something they can hold their government to ... while they were always sort 
of inbetween, sort of sitting on the fence when it came to aid or debt’ (interview, 2013). 
 
The move from aid to tax shrank the space for governments to blame other international 
actors. The interviewee noted: ‘the IMF would always say to us, “oh well it's not us, it's the 
government”, and then the government would say to us “it's not us, it's the IMF”. At least with 
tax, when it comes to tax holidays, harmful tax incentives, it’s no-one else but the 
government … who signs these contracts. And the World Bank is not mentioned in these 
[tax] contracts so in many respects there is a lot more that you can [do] ... there aren't as 
many players’ (interview, 2013). One could say that governments did not have power (or did 
not want) to challenge multinational corporations. Yet, that still begs the question why that 
power was absent (or not used), and what could be done regionally or globally. The ball 
continued to fall with governments to organise, and that was another reason why African and 
Asian country staff liked tax as an issue (interview, 2013).  
 
Besides these strategic advantages, some African and Asian country directors were morally 
uncomfortable with supporting aid campaigns that paradoxically paralysed their 
governments’ autonomy. Their push for tax issues also responded to a will for financial 
sufficiency. A report later clarified: ‘our staff and partners in developing countries … believe 
that developing countries should themselves be able to finance more of the services that are 
essential to tackling poverty, through tax revenue’ (ActionAid UK 2009: 2). 
 
Meanwhile, aid-centred activism was causing some internal divisions. Staff from Italy and the 
UK were conscious of the counter-arguments, yet defended the importance of aid claims to 
keep holding European governments accountable (Newman 2010; AA senior staff member, 
feedback, 2016). Other staff agreed to see the aid approach as an opportunity, but only as a 
method suitable for European staff vis-à-vis their governments, not for others in the ActionAid 
Federation (Newman 2010). The European-driven management of aid advocacy was also 
seen as reinforcing ‘North-South’ power relations in ActionAid, while aid was considered a 
distraction from the real challenges of development financing (Newman 2010). By 2010, an 
internal report distanced the NGO from aid by stating the need to move from a past focussed 
on aid, and a present centred on development financing (including tax justice), to a future of 
global redistribution (Hall in Newman 2010).  
 
The oldest country member and main financial bastion in the Federation, AAUK, welcomed 
the idea of tax. The UK development sector was experiencing some fatigue at the time with 
previous financing development campaigns like debt and trade. AAUK also needed a 
campaign angle that would enable them to question the responsibility for a UK target on 
development problems in low-income countries – be it a UK multinational or the UK 
government. That angle existed for tax – to expose the poverty effects arising in African and 
Asian countries from the alleged tax avoidance by UK corporations (AAUK ex-staff member, 
interview, 2013). Moreover, the UK was responsible for a large percentage of tax havens, 
which constituted territories where taxes were low or zero to non-residents, and were also 
secretive (AA senior staff member, feedback, 2016). 
 
Despite these advances in the tax agenda, the road towards tax campaigning was not 
without internal resistance. The UK’s role in tax havens created a constant tension with the 
department of fundraising in AAUK. Small but affluent ActionAid groups in Guernsey and 
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Jersey, themselves tax haven territories with the complicity of the UK government, withdrew 
funding when they heard of the campaign. The gesture raised some concern about how far 
such withdrawals would stretch, fearing a donor domino effect (AAUK ex-staff member, 
interview, 2013). Some considered the government, too, might join a potential funding 
withdrawal (AA senior staff member, feedback, 2016).  
 
The effect only materialised with a few donors, and many in ActionAid deemed the fear of 
donor withdrawal in AAUK’s fundraising department and among some country members to 
be misplaced (AA senior staff member, feedback, 2016). Discussions on the likely loss of 
funding eventually led to ethical debates about the organisation's financial sources (AAUK 
ex-staff member, interview, 2013). For instance, many major donors who were potential 
ActionAid donors kept their money in trust funds and family savings plans in tax havens. 
These were part of the unjust tax system that ActionAid was aiming to criticise with its 
campaign (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). 
 
Externally, ActionAid’s first campaign steps coincided with a rise of tax justice civil activity. 
Started in 2003, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) brought together senior and retired bankers 
who wanted to change the global financial system in which they had previously worked 
(AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). The TJN envisaged itself as an NGO despite its 
professional origins, and wanted to play a part alongside other NGOs (AA senior staff 
member, feedback, 2016). Despite its extensive inside knowledge, the TJN had few linkages 
with African and Asian organisations at that time. This is what NGOs like Christian Aid (and 
later ActionAid) were in a position to offer – access to partners and financial support, 
combined with the policy space built from past work on economic justice issues such as debt, 
trade and aid (AA senior staff member, feedback, 2016; AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 
2013). TJN-Africa was founded in 2007. 
 
NGOs like Christian Aid and Norwegian Church Aid had worked together on tax for some 
years. The thinking on tax opened up with work done by Charles Abugre and Sony Kapoor at 
Christian Aid – which they referred to as ‘plugging the leaks’ – as well as John Christensen’s 
initiatives at the TJN (AA senior staff member, feedback, 2016). In 2008, Christian Aid and 
the Norwegian Church Aid published a cutting-edge report on the effects of the international 
tax system in Tanzania, and the elusive roles of gold mining multinationals and the 
Tanzanian state (Curtis and Lissu 2008). Christian Aid not only had data and experience, but 
also strong technical capital. One of its staff, a former academic, proved crucial for data 
credibility at that point: ‘Christian Aid came up with this figure ... Alex Cobham … knew how 
to take these calculations from his … technical background that none of us at ActionAid had’ 
(AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).  
 
The UN Doha Conference on Financing for Development held in Qatar in 2008 (a follow-up to 
the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development held in Mexico in 2002) gave a push 
to the growing coalition of international development actors interested in tax: ‘that was an 
opportunity for all of us to kind of meet in person, and it's through those connections that we 
consolidated a group of international actors … it [tax] was very new, and I think we sort of 
needed each other’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).  
 
At least two other external factors propelled the emergence of tax as a campaign issue – a 
saturation of previous campaigns on development finance in ActionAid and other NGOs, and 
the advent of the global financial crisis.  
 
Economic justice topics, such as the role in the UK of both governments and banks in aid, 
trade and debt, had been active in some NGO campaigning in the UK since the end of the 
1970s (Luetchford and Burns 2003). Live Aid became the first large-scale campaign in the 
1980s, followed by Jubilee 2000 on debt cancellation in the 1990s, and Make Poverty History 
on aid, debt and trade in the mid-2000s (Yanacopulos 2016). After that, a certain saturation 
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with previous campaigns opened the space for a new theme to fill the gap: ‘before, that 
space was completely saturated with trade, debt and IMF conditionality ... and those 
campaigns kind of came to an end, almost maybe to a natural end’ (AAUK ex-staff member, 
interview, 2013). 
 
In a way, this natural end referred to the different active and passive cycles of a campaign: 
‘debt reached a stopping point for many with the 2005 Gleneagles G8 meeting; after the 
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial [WTO´s 6th Ministerial Conference], most people decided the 
WTO was nicely stalemated (true until quite recently [2016]); and with the IMF, we’d gotten 
concessions on conditions, and there was movement (although not swift) in a positive 
direction after the financial crisis and Strauss-Kahn became managing director’ (AA senior 
staff member, feedback, 2016). 
 
ActionAid staff read the situation as an opportunity: ‘there was a feeling of “I don’t want to do 
IMF conditionality anymore, it doesn’t necessarily take us anywhere”, and debt had already 
been done and trade negotiations were on hold ... [tax] seemed like the logical place to go. 
And then because there was this request from the South[ern country members] ... things 
aligned in a certain way’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).  
 
In 2008, the global financial crisis hit and opportunistically lined up with ActionAid's internal 
tax moves, the emerging tax justice international coalition, and the sector’s saturation with 
other campaigns: ‘I was in the office in August the day that Lehman Brothers went bankrupt 
... we all just sort of looked at each other and thought ... “this is it, this is the perfect time for 
the tax campaign”’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). The financial crisis and the 
need to find liquid revenue positioned taxation as a topical campaign focus. Moreover, the 
tax narrative was inherently powerful, as calculations showed that a reformed international 
tax system would be able to collect much more than the amount ever achievable through aid 
or trade means (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). At the end of an agitated period, 
favourable factors offset the internal funding concerns against tax issues in ActionAid. The 
TJC was ready to start, and AAUK took the lead within the ActionAid Federation.  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from reading this first thinking-about-tax period between 2005 
and 2007 in ActionAid. First, this was a period of changing major frames of activist work – 
away from aid, debt and trade, and towards taxation. This transition did not bring a full frame 
transformation, but was rather cumulative. In practice, aid claims have not been replaced by 
tax claims, but remained and co-existed with them. This may have been a response to 
financial and communication reasons. Financially, aid claims ensured that aid funding was 
preserved to sustain the very financial mobilising structures that permitted tax work. As for 
communication, old aid claims helped introduce new ones such as tax, and helped them 
resonate with activist audiences unaware of the topic – for instance, AAUK noted that 
developing countries lost three times more to tax havens than they received in aid each 
year.22 Finally, there was probably a tension between gaining new supporters for tax, without 
losing those already mobilised by and/or only concerned about aid.  
 
The second conclusion is that the frame of tax justice was still treated as a unitary claim in 
ActionAid during this period – a sort of gift box that was not yet ready to be opened, but just 
exposed and reclaimed. The diversification of tax justice meanings, with the internal tensions 
attached to them, was to come later. We now turn to explore that period. 
 
  
                                                            
22  <www.actionaid.org.uk/latest-news/investment-into-developing-countries-via-tax-havens>.          
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3.2 Tax corporate claims – the first steps of the Tax Justice Campaign (2008-
2011) 
 
AAUK led initial activities of the Tax Justice Campaign with a perspective focusing on tax 
avoidance by corporations. This approach led to tension during the initial stages in several 
country members of the ActionAid International Federation. Tension continued during the 
planning period, when the campaign was scaled up at Federation level.  
 
AAUK was the first country member in the ActionAid International Federation to work on tax. 
During these initial steps, tax justice was introduced as exposing corporate tax avoidance, 
understood as the legal arrangements around and within companies in a multinational group 
purposefully created to reduce their tax payments. For instance, the first research piece on 
tax focused on tax avoidance and was published in 2008.23 Public campaigning followed 
soon after, with campaign case studies exposing how the tax procedures of a UK company 
or bank affected tax collection in an African or Asian country.  
  
Tax avoidance has stayed as an ongoing line of research and campaign work for AAUK. The 
first AAUK public tax campaign reported the tax operations of South African beer brewing 
multinational SABMiller in countries like Ghana, India and Mozambique (2010). Following this 
AAUK targeted the Anglo-Swiss trading and mining multinational Glencore (2011), Zambia 
Sugar, which is part of the multinational Associated British Foods (2013), Barclays Bank's tax 
policies in Africa (2013-14), Paladin, the Australian mining company in Malawi (2015), and 
several oil and gas companies in Nigeria (2016). 
 
At the time AAUK started campaigning, other country members like Bangladesh also showed 
interest in taking up tax issues, but they did not have enough staff availability: ‘[they] didn’t 
have the time in their work plans ... [to get] the campaign going ... disparity [existed] between 
AAUK having three [full-time] people working on it [tax] and countries having a quarter of the 
person's time’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). As a result, AAUK staff would travel 
to the African or Asian country to research the case study and cover for the lack of national 
staff available (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).  
 
The disparity between AAUK staff availability and that of other country members, as well as 
AAUK campaign expertise, meant that the initial campaigns were driven by AAUK’s 
corporate perspective. AAUK campaigns would operate through bilateral agreements with 
other African or Asian country members, and consecutive one-year in-depth case studies 
would take place targeting single corporations or banks. This was initially welcomed by other 
country members: ‘the campaign started being heavily driven from an MNC [multinational 
corporation] angle, and I don’t think that posed any challenges for [ActionAid] countries’ 
(AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). 
 
However, the international corporate tax avoidance angle soon faced practical challenges, 
and the need to take it to the national level became apparent by 2009-10. Most African and 
Asian national governments did not have the resources to manage that complex topic and 
had other priorities: ‘we also needed to say something about African countries particularly, 
but also South Asian countries’ lack of capacity to monitor taxation and MNCs [multinational 
corporations] and do anything about transfer pricing24... we then tried to have a bit more 
focus on the policy demands around building the capacity of African … or Southern revenue 
tax authorities to be able to track situations of transfer pricing’ (AAUK ex-staff member, 
interview, 2013).  
                                                            
23  <www.actionaid.org.uk/policy-and-research/research-and-publications/tax-justice?keys=&page=3>.      
24  Transfer pricing happens whenever two companies that are part of the same multinational group trade with each other. 
Transfer mispricing happens when transfer pricing is manipulated or abusive, and is related to tax avoidance. 
<www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/>.  
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For AAUK to maintain its corporate narrative while keeping other ActionAid country 
Federation members and their national administrations interested, it was necessary to tackle 
the tax avoidance discourse at a national level and advocate for a stronger governmental 
role against tax avoidance. The adapted claim gradually gained strength: ‘it is a strand of 
work that is getting stronger and stronger now [2013], so we've been engaging at the African 
Union level on tax and with African tax revenue officials’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 
2013). 
 
In addition to this adaptation of tax avoidance from a focus on governmental capacity and 
resources, the claim of harmful tax incentives gained popularity between ActionAid staff 
during the first bilateral campaigns in 2010-11. Tax incentives were understood in the 
campaign as tax privileges granted by governments to multinationals in order, allegedly, to 
attract their investment. ActionAid denounced many of these incentives, since they created a 
perverse competition between countries to gain investment. 
 
Thus after a few years of campaigning, the notion of tax justice broadened beyond the initial 
tax avoidance framing used by ActionAid. As compared to tax incentives, tax avoidance25 
claims had international or supranational targets, which were mostly multinationals, and, 
secondarily the G20, OECD, UN and governments. Instead, the tax incentive26 claims mostly 
targeted those national governments offering harmful tax incentives, and then, secondarily, 
supranational bodies like the African Union that had the power to challenge the tax 
competition created regionally as a result of tax incentives. 
 
These two tax justice claims existed in tension in ActionAid and in the sector. On the one 
hand, many African and Asian country staff preferred to work on tax incentives: ‘African and 
Asian governments are powerless against transfer pricing [tax avoidance] regulation. Those 
rules are all decided in international forums that they are not a part of. So it was not at all 
empowering to governments to say “stop transfer pricing” … what was in their control were 
the tax incentives, and a lot of the Southern colleagues were saying that's what they want to 
work on’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). In 2010, TJN-Africa sponsored a meeting 
to agree on a campaign frame able to both respond to international interest on tax policy and 
mobilise people in Africa. As a result, the majority of actors present in the meeting, including 
ActionAid, agreed on selecting tax incentives. Further research work on tax incentives was 
then undertaken by ActionAid and TJN-Africa in five Eastern African countries in 2011-2013 
(AA senior staff member, feedback, 2016). 
 
On the other hand, the UK government had no role in relation to tax incentives granted by 
third party countries. Thus, for AAUK tax avoidance presented the only claim with a UK 
campaign angle. Additionally, the global crisis was too much of an opening to be allowed to 
pass unchallenged with regards to tax avoidance (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).  
 
While the first bilateral tax avoidance campaigns led by AAUK continued, discussions started 
in ActionAid to scale up the campaign to other members in the Federation. A working group 
was formed to draft a campaign proposal as an input to the 2012-17 new global Federation 
strategy. While the first bilateral campaigns had raised discussions about tax avoidance and 
tax incentive options, debates in this group turned around the role of local level participation.  
 
This interest was partly a response to the goal in the Federation strategy of reaching 5 million 
supporters and 5 million young people (ActionAid 2012): ‘there was a need [in the ActionAid 
Federation] which maybe wasn't so pressing when AAUK was leading the campaign, which 
was now to connect it to the local ... the [Federation’s] strategy ha[d] very ambitious targets 
                                                            
25  Also known as tax dodging – this includes tax havens, transfer pricing and double taxation treaties. 
26  Also known as tax breaks – this includes tax holidays, a type of tax incentive by which companies do not pay tax for a 
period, and the tax competition that is created amongst neighbouring countries to attract companies. 
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about the number of people we want[ed] to mobilise’ (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 
2013). Logistically, these numerical targets required local mobilisation and participation: ‘if 
you want that many people mobilising, then it can’t just be your national coalition of partners 
who are just national NGOs … and it can’t just be our Northern supporters who, you know, 
come out for the G20 event and protest … those people are in the local rights' programmes 
… we don't have them at the national level in capital cities’ (AAUK ex-staff member, 
interview, 2013). 
 
The AAUK ex-staff member recalls how the initial proposal aimed to build national-level 
coalitions that would link up with the local. Yet, the likely addition of more tax claims, such as 
VAT problems (see Figure 3), was seen as risking fragmentation in the campaign message, 
coherence and coalition-building: ‘we don't want to make the campaign too broad ... so that it 
looks very different in different countries … if the tax coalition[s] decided that in Bangladesh 
the issue of VAT would really be the thing they wanted to talk about, then it would look really 
different from South Africa who wanted to look into transfer pricing [related to tax avoidance] 
or Zambia that wanted to look into tax competition [related to tax incentives]. So how are we 
… to engage locally but have some common demands and image internationally and even 
nationally?. 
 
Figure 3 Competing narratives on tax justice in ActionAid, 2008-2014 
 
 
Eventually, the drafting group strategy to 
prioritise local-to-national coalitions did not 
materialise and led the Federation to gravitate 
towards international and national campaign 
levels (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 
2013). Instead, the Federation voted to 
integrate the local level differently. First, by 
bridging corporate tax claims to the potential 
financing of public services with the slogan 
‘progressive taxation for progressive spending’ 
(ActionAid 2012: 137). The second bridging 
tactic was to compare corporate tax to the tax paid by small traders, suggesting that the 
former pay proportionally less than the latter (e.g. ActionAid UK 2012, Figure 4).  
 
These were bridging frames that could function as standard for most countries, and still 
talked to the realm of international policies where international NGOs operated. However, the 
capacity of these frames to identify subnational targets and to mobilise people locally was 
more questionable, as explored in the next sections. 
Figure 4 Example of local-to-
international frame 
Source: AAUK (2012) 
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3.3 Towards local claims – involving other ActionAid member countries in the 
Tax Justice Campaign (2012-2014)  
 
ActionAid used tax frames alongside aid frames to mobilise people at the early conception 
stage of the campaign. Then, it moved towards integrating ideas like state tax capacity and 
tax incentives to the initial tax avoidance frame in the first steps of the campaign. With the 
campaign’s federalisation, the need emerged to link corporate tax claims to the local level. 
This consisted of notions such as taxes-for-public-services, and tax comparisons between 
companies and small traders. This section looks at which tax claims were found locally in 
comments raised by market traders in Nigeria, and if, and how, these were integrated into 
ActionAid’s campaign.  
 
The tax justice campaign had been selected as one of the three multi-country campaigns to 
be scaled up across ActionAid in the new 2012-17 global strategy, alongside land and 
women’s rights campaigns. In 2013, the campaign was launched and started to function in 
several countries, including Nigeria. By then, the campaign had integrated tax avoidance, tax 
incentives and tax transparency as its key demands: ‘[tax incentives] had to come through 
because people did not just want to work on transfer pricing [tax avoidance]’ (AAUK ex-staff 
member, interview, 2013). Corporate tax incentives had become the focus of the 
Federation’s campaign launch (AA senior staff member/AA Tax Justice Campaigner, 
feedback, 2016). These were all international and national claims – yet, it is important to now 
ask: what happened at the local level where the NGO had planned to mobilise people 
beyond capital cities to reach its numerical targets and campaign goals? 
 
The campaign was launched in Nigeria in July 2013. During my two stays in 2013 and 2014, 
AAN had covered international, national and local tax issues (AAN campaign team meetings/ 
observation, Abuja, 2013-14). In my first stay in 2013, AAN focused on tax incentives. 
Targets included federal investment authorities and politicians directly involved in granting 
tax incentives (TJC launch, observation, Abuja, 2013). Some evidence existed about the 
secrecy and discretion in which tax incentives were granted, and companies that had 
changed their name to receive tax incentives more than once (TJC launch, National 
Association of Nigerian Traders speech, Abuja, 2013). Meanwhile, AAN worked on a paper 
on the subject of tax treaties [related to international tax avoidance] between Mauritius and 
Nigeria.  
 
A year later, during my second stay, an African Union Finance Ministers Conference27 was 
held in Abuja in March 2014. ActionAid, AAUK, African ActionAid offices, and African tax 
justice coalitions had travelled to the event. A report on illicit financial flows [tax avoidance] 
was to be presented to the ministers by former South African president, Thabo Mbeki. The 
potential for regional advocacy and campaigning about the role of tax treaties in enabling 
corporate tax avoidance was evident. AAN targeted their own finance minister, as she was 
also part of the African Union High Level Panel on illicit financial flows. Slogans on tax 
holidays [tax incentives] also remained present in actions during the African Union 
Conference.  
 
At the same time, the AAN campaign team had undertaken tax work at subnational and local 
levels. AAN published two policy briefs about Nigeria's tax policy and administration and the 
effects of Nigeria’s tax system on women (ActionAid Nigeria 2013b, 2013a). Before the 
national campaign launch in Abuja, AAN had organised a series of ‘budget and tax justice’ 
workshops with partners and allies in Benue, Delta, Kaduna and Ondo states (workshop 
reports/observation, Abuja, 2013). A key issue faced by market traders that was mentioned 
in these workshops was multiple taxation, which was understood as a situation in which a 
taxpayer is taxed more than once for the same activity or item due to a lack of tax collection 
                                                            
27  <www.uneca.org/pages/about-conference-1>.  
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harmonisation between national, state and local administrative tiers (Oboh et al. 2013; 
Pitigala and Hoppe 2011). 
 
Earlier on, ActionAid local partner in Ondo, JDPC, had recorded a video on tax justice with 
market traders and tax administrators of the area.28 JDPC-Ondo had launched this on its 
regional TV show, JDPC ½ hour.29 JDPC’s coordinator summarised the lack of tax statistics 
and transparency, a poor tax administration and a multiplicity of tax payments or multiple 
taxation as three key challenges. In turn, the traders interviewed in the video noted the lack 
of benefits or public services that should derive from the taxes they paid. Traders also noted 
sudden and steep tax increases and flat tax rates that ended up being disproportionate for 
some payers. Untailored taxes are part of the methods of presumptive tax collection common 
in the informal sector.30 Complaints were also made about tax collection misuse and 
harassment of traders. 
 
Some of these claims were also studied by Okonkwo (2016a, 2016b), who found out that, in 
Onitsha city, south-east Nigeria, charges had gone up from NGN192, to NGN4,800, to 
NGN30,800 for accumulated tax arrears.31 Women traders had asked local tax authorities to 
change standardised collective payments for individual business assessments and adapted 
tax collection. In Onitsha, the state government task force on revenue collection is popularly 
known as Ndi Mpiawa Azu (those who break peoples’ backs with sticks). 
 
Claims similar to those gathered in the video also emerged in interviews held with traders 
during market visits (2013-14). For instance, the chairman of the rice sellers association at 
Ojo-Oba [Isikan] market in Akure explained that they paid three types of taxes every year – 
income tax, industrial tax and local government tax.32 He added that all members complied 
with paying taxes, because they thought that these were just if used properly – for instance, 
in schools and hospitals. Yet, he complained that the tax was high and that they were being 
taxed based on the size of their shop and quantity of stock, instead of their income or profit 
(Etim 2014b).  
 
The existence of multiple taxes is aggravated by the fact that they exist in parallel with other 
multiple payments, such as market rent and service fees (electricity, toilets, waste 
management and water). Moreover, payments may not start at the marketplace for a trader, 
but earlier in the chain, all the way from the product collection point to the market selling 
point, especially if products cross state borders. For instance, the leader of the Eso di Owo 
plantain association said that they paid taxes for lorry loading and for moving beyond a state 
boundary. The loading permission was collected by the local government at their shop. The 
amount was NGN300-NGN500, but varied depending on the product quantity – it was 
NGN2,500 for big loads – and at each marketplace. She said there was no specific amount 
for the state boundaries, and it depended on the goods. It was the state government that 
collected at the borders. A member of the same association, in another interview, confirmed 
that they paid NGN500 for loading stuff, although they paid more (NGN1,000) in the nearest 
market because the place was bigger. The local government collected every five days 
(Akure’s outskirts market, 2014).  
 
Added to situations where there was multiple taxation and multiple payments was the 
existence of touts, or fake tax collectors, charging market traders (JDPC video, 2013) – 
                                                            
28  Some tax activities held by partners started before the Nigerian TJC had been launched, which shows some level of 
partner autonomy vis-à-vis the international campaign planning process led by ActionAid´s Federation. 
29  Video (Ondo 2013): <https://youtu.be/5GHgiJ2osTE>.  
30  Presumptive taxation is a method of tax collection that uses indirect estimations of the income on which tax should be 
levied. See <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2013.00429.x/pdf>. Since flat tax rates derive from 
ballpark calculations on the size of a business place or product sold rather than on the exact income that traders make, 
these were deemed unjust.   
31         The approximate exchange rate at the time of fieldwork (2013-14) was GBP1 to NGN481. 
32  For the sake of simplicity, we are considering Isikan and Oja-Oba bordering markets in Akure centre as one entity. 
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multiple collectors. Some unions charged with the intermediary role of collecting tax were 
also identified with tax misuse. A butchers’ association member noted he paid NGN500 tax 
to the union leader, and then the leader paid the government. Yet, they did not know the 
exact amount that the state collected from the leader (Akure’s outskirts market, 2014). A 
plantain association member in the same market added: ‘government officials brought some 
receipt books so that the association collects tax. Some boys fought for the emancipation 
[sic] … they don’t want the government to intervene’.  
Market taxes were often collected 
as an immediate payment, which 
sometimes came accompanied by 
harassment, such as seizure of 
products and shop closures. 
Quick payments aimed to prevent 
non-registered or highly mobile 
taxpayers from evading 
payments. Ondo’s tax inspector 
noted that it is common for traders 
to relocate in the event of high tax 
obligations (JDPC video, 2013).  
 
Still other interviewees claimed 
that women, and especially 
widows, should pay no tax 
(market interviews/ workshops, 
Akure, 2014). A market woman in 
Isikan market explained: ‘I am not supposed to pay tax. Why I go pay tax? I am responsible 
for my children and home … I can’t allow you to take my photo [said to the interviewers 
during the market visit] but you can take my photo with my three children on the street 
protesting when women are forced to pay tax’ (Etim 2014b). Another widow with seven 
children selling yam flour stressed that widows should be taken care of and be seen as part 
of the government’s responsibility rather than paying tax (Etim 2014a). These claims 
resonate with the protests of women against female taxation since the 1920s described in 
Section 1.5. More extracts from interviews with traders were gathered in Sempere (2015).  
 
Two claims, among the many made by traders, became predominant in the campaign at the 
national level, namely tax-for-public-services and multiple taxation (see Figure 5). It is not 
fully clear why some claims were taken up by the campaign, while others were not. Some 
claims, such as 'no tax for women', would have been difficult to defend in a contemporary 
campaign. It would appear that market women gain money as men do despite their other 
roles, so they should pay tax. Yet, tax exemption for some groups like widows, if not all 
women, was a case that could be made. 
 
On the other hand, ActionAid’s campaign strategy already came with a tax-for-public-services 
discourse, so this, in a way, coincided with what we found was claimed by traders. The 
campaign presented the idea that funding of public services could arise as a result of ending 
tax avoidance and harmful tax incentives. However, traders linked funding for public services 
as being what arose from their own payments of tax and fees. This was a sort of smaller tax 
cycle, both collected and spent in the area. We only heard of one trader noting something 
close to corporate taxation: ‘this tax is the one that they will cooperate [use] for the government 
workers. But maybe I'm hearing that there's oil in our nation, but I don’t know what they are 
using the money for, the money of the oil. We in communities, we don’t know’ (interview, 
Gobue, FCT, 2013). As for the inclusion of multiple taxation as the other campaign claim raised 
nationally, it is uncertain why AAN/JDPC-Ondo selected this, instead of, for instance, the 
challenges of tax rises and flat rates.  
 
Claimed made by traders  Claims made in the campaign  
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
 
Tax for public services 
(linked to local and market services 
they use) 
 
Multiple taxation 
 
Tax corruption 
Tax harassment 
Flat rates/presumptive tax 
collection 
No tax for women/widows 
Tax avoidance 
Tax incentives 
Tax inefficiency / transparency 
(linked to low non-oil tax revenue) 
 
Tax for public services 
(linked to corporate frames) 
 
 
Multiple taxation 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
--- 
Figure 5 Comparative list of claims made by 
traders and claims made in the campaign 
Source: compiled and interpreted by the author from the JDPC tax video, 
interviews with traders in markets, campaign observation including 
workshops with traders, and campaign documents. 
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3.4 Campaign actions and their relation to market traders (2008-2014) 
 
In the past sections, we examined the history of the Tax Justice Campaign and the claims 
that AAUK, ActionAid’s secretariat, AAN, and JDPC-Ondo had put forward at each level. We 
compared this to the claims of traders. This section moves from claims to look at the actions 
led by the different campaign actors, and whether, and how, they involved traders.  
 
A ‘repertoire of action’ is a set of protest actions that a group can use to make claims, such 
as a march or a strike (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 2006). As part of the idea of resonance, certain 
claims – and the actions that represent them – work best when they are culturally appropriate 
and able to match the audience's priorities. If we take market traders as the audience, 
several efforts were made in the campaign to integrate them through claims and actions.  
 
As seen, claims that bridged international/national and local levels were explicitly sought. 
Equally, information about tax claims by traders was collected and fed into the campaign, for 
example through the JDPC-Ondo video and workshops. Some campaign actions did 
integrate traders (see this section). However, there was no formal campaign strategy to 
integrate actions led by traders taking place outside the campaign (see next section). 
 
Internationally, ActionAid's tax campaign team at the international secretariat had some 
tactics to link up to national and local levels through actions. For instance, they supported 
regional activism by informing country activists of regional opportunities, such as the African 
Union Conference taking place in Abuja in 2014. They also coordinated online, through email 
and SMS (Internal ActionAid TJC Team Newsletters, Feb 2013-Dec 2014). This included a 
photo petition in which people filled up a note for a photo with the public service they would 
most like to have financed in their area through tax. These could then be handed in to local 
and national campaign targets, used in exhibitions, and/or uploaded with the hashtag 
#taxpaysfor.33 While some ‘tax pays for’ examples with traders took place, the initiative was 
not systematically applied with them.  
 
In Abuja, AAN staff and campaigners mobilised with rallies, online/mobile actions, traditional 
and Twitter conferences, theatre sketches, and government pressure through visits and 
workshops. AAN staff also covered high-level lobbying visits such as breakfast meetings and 
media work (see Figure 6). In AAN actions, market traders intervened in some conferences 
and workshops where tax authorities were also present, for instance, the national campaign 
launch.  
 
In Akure, JDPC-Ondo undertook a number of state-level initiatives on tax, including the tax 
TV documentary, advocacy visits to tax authorities, tax workshops between farmers/traders 
and government officials, tax rallies and ‘market storms’ (see Figure 6). Market storms were 
when campaigners visited markets and other popular places like motor parks and bus stops. 
Market traders were informed and given leaflets. They were interviewed about their problems 
and sometimes these were captured by audio or video recorders. Market storms could be 
part of street marches or stand-alone (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). They 
were performed by Activista youth campaigners in places like Abuja, Akure and Lagos 
(Activistas records and observation, 2013-14). Market storms involved traders who were not 
known previously by ActionAid´s partners or the campaign. 
 
  
                                                            
33  <http://taxpaysfor.tumblr.com/>.  
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Figure 6 Examples of AAN and JDPC repertoires of action 
 Source: Akinola Adekunle and Kas Sempere 
 
Some interaction between tax authorities and market traders existed in campaign actions, 
notably in workshops and market storms. For instance, JDPC-Ondo invited the Ondo’s state 
tax inspector and other tax governmental roles to a rally and market storm in Akure. The tax 
authorities participated, carrying the same placards as JDPC-Ondo and youth campaigners 
(Activista report and photos, Akure, 2013; see Figure 7). While market storms could be 
initially seen as informative actions, they turned more political when governmental authorities 
were invited and challenged to hear about market people’s tax challenges first-hand. 
However, the sight of NGOs alongside these authorities ran the risk of being misread by 
traders as a sign of NGO co-option. 
 
This interaction was not always straightforward, and some preparatory work was needed by 
JDPC-Ondo staff and campaigners. For instance, this particular rally-market storm involved 
prior work with state tax authorities that included media sensitisation and indoor advocacy. 
First, a video was recorded about tax problems from market traders, which included tax 
authorities as interviewees. Then, the video went live on a TV programme run by JDPC-
Ondo. An advocacy visit to the tax authorities followed some days later. After that visit, the 
rally took place in the central Akure market with the authorities (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 Ways of relating to tax authorities in Akure 
  
3.5 Market trader actions and their relation to the campaign (2008-2014)  
 
This section shifts the perspective from internal campaign actions and whether and how they 
involved market traders, to tax actions taken up by traders themselves outside the campaign. 
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How similar were their own actions to those undertaken through the campaign, and how 
integrated were the former with the latter? An examination of the traders’ actions shows that 
they were different to those carried out in the campaign, and that no strategic thinking had 
taken place to integrate the two. In fact, some of the actions were too unpredictable or too 
drastic to be part of a wider campaign.  
 
Integrating the demands and actions of market traders into the campaign was important for 
campaign mobilisation and ownership. Market traders dealt with their daily tax challenges 
vis-à-vis tax authorities in diverse ways. I have categorised these actions into three groups – 
individual petty resistance, collective demands and negotiation, and collective protest 
actions. Petty resistance includes small disagreements over tax receipts by individual traders 
with tax collectors, as well as the arrangement of taxable stock to pay less. Demands and 
negotiation covers letters and visits to the authorities from traders. Protest actions include 
closing down shops and confronting tax collectors collectively on their arrival. 
 
Only the last category, collective protest actions, would be considered repertoires in the strict 
sense. Yet, I present the whole spectrum of tax practices by traders to put their protest 
actions in perspective. Also, in the larger sense of the word, I still consider petty resistance 
and demands and negotiation as less overt political practices in what are very delicate 
contexts in which to protest (Scott 1990). Moreover, we cannot understand one category 
without the others, as they are likely to feed each other – for example, the sum of small petty 
resistance and discontent can nurture larger collective action.  
 
An example of petty resistance was seen with farmer and trader Oluchi in peri-urban Kuje, 
FCT state, who shared how getting hold of the right tax receipt, or getting it at all, was often a 
battle for payees (interview, 2013). Receipts could be absent, fake or incomplete. She once 
had to disagree, to little effect, about the tax receipt’s amount, since the quantity registered 
by the tax officials in the receipt was less than the amount actually paid. While the trader said 
‘no’ to this, she seemed to be forced to eventually comply:  
 
There is [was] a certain time that I carry gari [cassava flour] to the market. They [tax 
collectors] write it on the receipt – NGN50 tax and they say that I will pay NGN400. I 
say no. [I say] I want to see it. They said I can’t see it. They wrote it down. They wrote 
down NGN50 while they collect[ed] NGN400 from me. Then they say, no. The quantity 
of gari is NGN400. They force me to collect the money. I give the money before I sell 
(interview, 2013).  
 
Another example of petty resistance was to arrange taxable products into smaller pieces to 
reduce the tax to be paid, as done by one farmer and market seller interviewed:  
 
Last year I carried yam in the market, I carried 100 tubers of yam. As I reach the 
market, I hear that the tax they put on the yam is more than the money I carry with me 
in the vehicle. So I don’t know how to do. I share [cut] this yam, 20, 20, 20, so that the 
tax[es] are not many, but they [tax collectors] come, they say … the back of the yam is 
the same colour, so they joined it together. Big tax. I paid almost NGN1,000 …  
 
I sold the yam for NGN7,000. I paid the tax for NGN1,000. I paid for transportation to 
carry the yam to the market NGN1500. I pay to transport myself back to the village. I 
pay NGN400 because of our road, it's not good, back to the house. I take NGN1,000 
out of the money, I buy ingredients [food]. I want to pay my children [school] fees. The 
money, no reach. Because the money I carry back ... I have many children … Who I 
will pay and who I will not pay? ... These are the challenges we are facing in our 
community (interview, Kuje, FCT, 2013). 
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Besides these tense individual interactions with tax authorities, another tax practice that 
market traders resorted to was to formulate collective demands through letters and visits to 
the authorities to ask for a reduction or a cancelation of tax. A 50-year-old yam seller at 
Akure’s main market Isikan explained to an interviewer (2013) an occasion where the 
government wanted to introduce a new tax of NGN10,000 per annum. The yam association 
went to the government on behalf of her, and other sellers to reject the new tax.  
 
In a visit to the same market a year after, a group of widows selling cloth also complained 
that they had visited the government to stop a tax rise without success, and that support from 
JDPC-Ondo had been requested. The widows’ group leader noted:  
 
The market woman pays a rent of NGN30,000 per year for her lock-up shop place in 
the market... The [state-level Board of] Internal Revenue is in charge of collecting tax. 
Sometimes they [tax collectors] don’t come monthly and sum up the payment of 
various months. If market people don’t pay, the authorities close up the shop. The 
government started coming three years ago. The first year they [traders] paid 
NGN2,000. Last year, the amount was raised to NGN3,000 and this year to 
NGN12,200 (interview, 2014). 
 
When the news came that they should pay NGN12,200, some members reported falling sick. 
The widows’ group leader herself fell sick for a week because they did not know where to get 
the money from. They went to the State Governor’s Office to complain, but there was no 
reply. She said that they have widows amongst their members or lazy husbands [sic] or 
those who collect bank loans. That amount is too much for people, so people take loans. She 
said: ‘take for example, I am a widow, I still have to feed my children, pay for school fees and 
house rent ... but if we don’t go out of the house, people are going to think we are lazy’ 
(interview, 2014). 
 
A final way in which traders avoided tax payments was through confrontation through closing 
down shops when the tax collectors arrived. A female trader in Kaduna’s central market 
explained that market traders had closed down shops and faced tax collectors to avoid 
paying a new tax (interview, 2014). Similarly, a collective shop closedown and revolt was 
reported in a central commercial street of Akure at the beginning of 2014. The president of 
the Tax Justice Network in Ondo, whose office is on that street, noted:  
 
For some time, this street … you can’t go to any shop, it is locked, because the 
commoners [sic] would be going, the local government is following. All close their 
shops … to pay NGN30,000 at the end of the month … [it is] so difficult to pay that … 
there was a mini protest, they wanted to [?] ... This street, when they came, they 
mobilised themselves, they confronted them [the tax officials] … 
 
… there is no money circulation, there is no employment for our children… no road, no 
electricity … When they [the traders] attacked, they [the government] withdrew back, 
they went back to strategise … they didn’t pay at that period, early this year, so the 
governor went back to strategise, the Board of Internal Revenue, and I think by the 
time they go back, they will be more forceful … it happens. Around Christmas time, 
people want to comply and the money is not in circulation’ (TJN-Ondo, group 
discussion 2014). 
 
In short, we can conclude that the actions initiated by traders outside the campaign just 
described were different to those found inside the campaign, which were described in the 
previous section. There was no strategic thinking on the campaign side to identify these 
trader-led actions and see how they could be integrated in the campaign. One reason for this 
could be related to the fact that NGOs function through pre-defined project activities. Also, 
some actions were too unexpected (petty resistance) or too confrontational (closing down 
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shops) to allow for alignment in a more planned and contained campaign repertoire. 
However, there is support for other actions such as letters and visits to the authorities that 
could have been easily integrated. Even the more confrontational actions could be supported 
where a campaign alignment exists. 
 
 
4  Discussion 
 
The previous section describes the claims and actions that developed during the tax 
campaign, and compares them to the tax claims and actions from traders outside the 
campaign. This section looks at how ActionAid managed to link up local, national and 
international campaign levels while staying autonomous and resonant at each level. This was 
important to mobilisation for at least two reasons. First, linking campaign levels provided a 
fuller reading of the causes of tax injustice that affected traders both inside and outside 
Nigeria – this distributed the onus and mobilising strategies for change across different 
political targets. Second, while linking levels was key, prioritising the most resonant claims at 
each level was equally important – this prompted greater engagement and response from the 
different targets at each level. At the local level, trader-led claims gave an indication as to the 
best entry points for mobilisation. 
 
Discussion 1. Linking up campaign levels was important to provide a full 
understanding of how tax injustice affected market traders in the campaign. The 
ability to include causes of tax injustice both inside and outside the country helped 
identify diversified and complementary political targets and opportunities for tax 
justice change. 
 
At different moments in the campaign, we could observe how a variety of claims were used 
at the same local event and, to a lesser extent, at the same national event. For instance, 
JDPC-Ondo and youth campaigners defended claims such as tax avoidance, tax incentives 
and multiple taxation in workshops held with campaigners and tax state authorities, as well 
as in market storms and rallies – see the rally in Akure with different tax claims in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 Diversity of tax claims in an Akure rally 
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This range of claims was also present at the national level in Abuja, although less often. For 
example, AAN campaign staff brought multiple taxation and other local matters to national 
attention through policy briefs and public events (observation, Abuja, 2013-14). Activista 
youth campaigners performed a self-made theatre sketch during the national campaign 
launch in Abuja, putting forward the challenges of multiple taxation and tax harassment faced 
by market traders.34 This was done in the presence of high-level decision-makers and civil 
servants, amongst which were the national tax authorities or Federal Inland Revenue35 and 
the national investment authorities or Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission36 
(observation, Abuja, 2013). 
 
We could thus say that campaign levels were linked up in two ways. First, by using frames 
that were themselves bridges, such as the end of international tax avoidance practices to 
finance local public services (see Section 3.2). Second, by using a range of claims with 
different international, national and local targets at a given level or event, for example a rally 
in Akure, a national campaign launch in Abuja.  
 
This linking of campaign levels through these different strategies was important for 
mobilisation, because it enabled a broader understanding of tax injustice for those involved. 
The different claims, when put together, exposed complementary international and domestic 
causes of tax injustice affecting traders in Nigeria. While tax avoidance emphasised an 
external cause affecting international targets, tax competition and multiple taxation unveiled 
more internal causes affecting national and local targets. Exposing only the international 
causes of tax injustice would have taken responsibility away from national and local targets 
such as the Nigerian government. On the other hand, exposing only the national and local 
causes of tax injustice would have assigned all the blame to national and local targets. 
Rather, the campaign reached complementary political targets and opportunities for change. 
 
In other words, tax avoidance exposed an international structure of tax injustice and poverty 
creation with multinational companies and foreign governments (including the UK and other 
OECD donor countries) that affected the national and local territory. The goal here was to 
achieve change at the international tax policy level. Yet, only looking at causes of tax 
injustice that are external to Nigeria would be incomplete. National and local interpretations 
of tax injustice (e.g. tax incentives, multiple taxation) addressed causes of poverty that did 
not have international causes and targets. This suggested that the causes of tax injustice 
were both external and internal to Nigeria, and that a complete framing of tax justice in the 
campaign was best for change. 
 
Additionally, this broader understanding is important for how campaign actors and targets 
such as market traders, the Nigerian government or the UK government are perceived and 
see themselves. For instance, in 2009-10 the Department for International Development’s 
tracking surveys suggested that the UK public saw the causes of poverty as internal to low-
income countries, with corruption seen as the main cause by over 50 per cent of 
respondents, as well as famine, war, natural disasters, bad governance and overpopulation. 
The only significant external causal factor identified was international debt, cited by 10 per 
cent of respondents (Glennie et al. 2012). 
 
Discussion 2. While linking levels was important for a coherent campaign perspective 
on tax justice and diversified mobilisation and targets, ‘reserving’ the most resonant 
claims at each level was conducive to more tailored responses from the different 
targets at each level. Locally, trader-led claims give a reference to the best entry 
points for mobilisation, before moving into more unknown or distant campaign claims. 
                                                            
34  Video (Abuja 2013): <www.youtube.com/watch?v=BO_NBw03O6o>.  
35  <www.firs.gov.ng>.  
36  <www.nipc.gov.ng>.  
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Claims attracted the attention of their targets best when these were played out at their 
respective natural levels – where the targets with decision-making power on that particular 
issue were located. Consider the next three situations at different levels of the campaign. 
Counter-frames from targets were identified here that did not agree on the meanings of tax 
avoidance, tax competition and multiple taxation as suggested in the campaign:  
 
 Internationally, a series of public exchange letters took place between ActionAid and the 
multinationals and banks targeted by the NGO, in which the meaning of tax avoidance 
was disputed. In the African Union Conference, Liberia’s Minister of Finance mentioned 
how ActionAid showed that treaties were unfair while the Mauritius representatives told 
an AAUK staff member that they should be ‘having a word’ (pers. comm, 2014). As a 
result, meetings were planned after the event between AAN and the Nigerian Minister of 
Finance’s assistant to discuss AAN’s participation in an upcoming tax stakeholder group 
(AAN staff member, pers. comm., 2014). 
 Nationally, a representative of the Federal Tax Authorities (FIRS) nuanced the term tax 
incentives as having ‘their good and their bad side’ during the national campaign launch 
in Abuja (observation, 2013). This obliged AAN to clarify and reiterate that they referred 
to harmful tax incentives to avoid an easy questioning of the campaign rationale – that is, 
accepting that there may be cases where tax privileges for multinationals are justified.37 
Reducing the number of tax incentives, or the way they are dispensed, is one of the 
easier unilateral actions that a national government can take (AA Tax Justice 
Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016). Thus, this looks like a key claim to campaign for 
nationally.  
 Locally, there was debate on the meaning of multiple taxation between Ondo’s tax 
authorities (the Ondo State Board of Internal Revenue, BIR-Ondo)38 and activists from 
JDPC-AAN. In a JDPC and Activista visit to the BIR-Ondo, an official denied the 
existence of multiple taxation by referring to the tax harmonisation regulations between 
federal, state and local governmental tiers. He attributed this term to the confusion that 
traders made between tax, rate and levy (Activista report, 2013). A month later, the AAN 
campaign officer exposed the legal loopholes, corruption and insufficient application of 
the tax harmonisation policy in a workshop coordinated by AAN and JDPC-Ondo and 
attended by BIR-Ondo (observation, Akure, 2013). The JDPC coordinator added on that 
occasion that: ‘tax or rate or levy we are dealing with humans. Money is dripping from my 
pocket … the local government, they don’t give flat rate but arbitrary bills … multiple 
taxation … comes from the same income, that of the poor person’ (observation, Akure, 
2013).39  
 
There were a variety of claims engaged in addressing different campaign targets, from 
international bodies to national and local authorities. Not all opponents engaged with the 
same frame even when the tax avoidance frame was present in all these three scenarios. 
For instance, Ondo’s tax authorities had little power over tax avoidance, while they could 
speak and act upon an issue such as multiple taxation. Targets were best engaged when the 
issues were familiar and viable to them.  
 
Frames that targeted activity by multinationals – tax avoidance and tax incentives – were not 
included in traders’ claims (see Section 3.3). Only AAN, JDPC-Ondo and youth campaigners 
campaigned on corporate taxation. As an AAUK ex-youth engagement manager reflected: ‘a 
lot of people who work in our … programmes say, well, I can’t go to the community that are 
                                                            
37  ActionAid had already defined harmful tax incentives in the Give us a Break report on corporate tax incentives used for 
the international TJC launch in 2013 (AA Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016). 
38  <www.jtb.gov.ng/state-boards-internal-revenue>.  
39  All these versions could be correct. While tax authorities could be right that there is confusion in the community around 
multiple taxation, it can still be the case that the problem of tax harmonisation persists. 
 
 
31
desperately poor, that really need an irrigation system, and be like: “you should be lobbying 
the government to stop tax breaks [tax incentives] for big multinational companies”’ 
(interview, 2013). 
 
Even when corporate frames were linked to public services in the campaign, they were still 
harder to activate. Financing public services from corporate tax is a legitimate and important 
claim. Yet, from a local angle, this process takes time to happen, which is less appealing for 
mobilisation. The frame would require, first, that the previous step of raising corporate tax 
nationally takes place; then that this money, once collected, is allocated to public services; 
and that it is properly distributed and managed. This is a long-term benefit loop for market 
traders to wait for. Instead, traders related the funding of public services to the money that 
was collected from them locally, rather than that which could be collected from corporations.  
 
Similarly, the comparative frame between the taxes that multinationals pay and those that 
market traders pay may not have the same resonance in all contexts. Ondo is a farming and 
civil service state with no industrial multinational activity (TJN-Ondo, group discussion, 2014). 
This increases the difficulty of identifying physically and culturally with a nearby corporate 
target. In the claims of traders, governmental authorities were the natural targets.  
 
From the perspective of resonance, market-trader-led claims can help campaigners to know 
the best entry points for mobilisation, before moving into less familiar or distant campaign 
claims such as tax avoidance and tax competition.40 This does not mean that claims with 
international and national targets should be excluded from local campaigning. As noted in 
Discussion 1, they are important for a full understanding of tax injustice, as this phenomenon 
is not only local, or national, or international, but multi-causal. Rather, claims with distant 
targets could be gradually introduced at a later stage in the campaign once local mobilisation 
has consolidated. All in all, it seems important that claims with local targets are introduced 
first and work autonomously, with or without the accompaniment of other claims. To a certain 
degree, this happened in the campaign when multiple taxation was discussed with market 
traders, for example with the JDPC-Ondo video, before corporate campaign claims were 
introduced. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
ActionAid’s tax justice campaign in Nigeria is a positive example of a locally grounded 
international campaign. The NGO’s decentralised and flexible structure facilitated this. Staff 
in ActionAid Nigeria and its partner organisation JDPC-Ondo were relatively autonomous 
from the international campaign's overall strategy plan. They led on campaign themes that 
were not part of the campaign planning initially, such as the challenges of multiple taxation 
raised by market traders outside the campaign.  
 
More could have been done to integrate market traders into the campaign. For instance, 
more local demands from traders could have been included, such as those on sudden and 
steep tax increases, tax harassment and claims on local tax collection for local public 
services. The campaign could also have supported the market traders’ actions – not only 
their claims – such as visits they made and letters they sent to governmental authorities 
outside the campaign, and even their tax strikes if, and when, they aligned with the campaign 
ethos.  
 
                                                            
40  ActionAid staff, partner staff and I designed a tax toolkit for ActionAid’s Tax Justice Campaign with three sections to 
progress from topics familiar to traders to less familiar ones in later stages, <www.actionaid.org/publications/tax-power-
campaign-reflection-action-toolkit>.  
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Overall, however, the campaign managed not only to integrate market traders’ demands as 
local campaigning, but also, on some occasions, to bring these issues before tax authorities 
at the national level. At the same time, national and international aspects such as tax 
avoidance and harmful tax incentives were also visible at the local level. Thus, ActionAid 
succeeded in linking local, national and international campaign levels, while staying relevant 
across the campaign by targeting different opponents at each level. 
 
This was important for at least two reasons. First, linking campaign levels facilitated greater 
understanding of the causes and targets of tax injustice affecting traders in the campaign, 
rather than only the international causes (such as tax avoidance by multinationals), or only 
the national and local causes (such as harmful tax incentives and multiple taxation by 
Nigerian authorities). Working at multiple levels distributed the responsibility and strategies 
for change across different political targets, and with better understanding of the challenges 
of tax injustice. This showed that the phenomenon is not only local, or national, or 
international, but multi-causal. Second, prioritising the most resonant claim and target at 
each level – tax avoidance internationally, harmful tax incentives nationally, and multiple 
taxation locally – encouraged engagement from campaign audiences and different political 
targets, from multinational corporations, to ministers, and to national and local tax authorities. 
 
The order in which campaign claims were introduced was also important. To a certain degree 
in the campaign, multiple taxation had already been discussed with market traders before 
international and national corporate campaign claims arrived – such as through the JDPC-
Ondo video. The trader-led claims are likely to be the best entry point to mobilise market 
populations, and make the campaign solid, effective and owned by them. This can be done 
before bringing in claims with less familiar and harder to activate targets at local level. 
Overall, claims with distant targets are better introduced at a later stage in the campaign 
once local mobilisation has consolidated. 
 
This paper aims to help build an understanding of international campaigns that achieve the 
greatest mobilisation of those most affected by the campaign topic. ActionAid’s work 
discussed here provides a positive example for other tax justice campaigns willing to give a 
stronger voice to market traders. At a theoretical level, the paper has sought to contribute to 
the tax literature by exploring the areas of tax activism and tax justice, especially from the 
perspective of local tax collection.  
 
Finally, the concepts chosen from social movement theory – frames, repertoires and 
resonance – did help navigate most aspects of the campaign. However, integrating other 
theoretical approaches, such as Scott’s (1990), could have been useful to gain a better 
understanding of the subtle and petty forms of resistance that happen in the marketplace. 
These forms of resistance are as important as – and probably interact with and feed – the 
smaller number of more politically overt traders’ claims and protests. 
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